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DoD Cloud Impact Levels Explained: IL2, IL4, IL5, IL6 and What They Mean for Your ATO

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DoD cloud Impact Levels are a classification of the data a cloud service is allowed to hold, defined by the DISA Cloud Computing Security Requirements Guide (CC SRG). IL2 covers public and non-controlled unclassified information. IL4 covers Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) and other mission data that is unclassified but not public. IL5 covers CUI that requires a higher level of protection, plus unclassified National Security System data. IL6 covers classified information up to SECRET. Each level dictates which cloud service offerings you may use, how the connection to DoD networks must be built, what the provider must have proven, and which controls you inherit versus own. Pick the wrong level and your ATO stalls before the first control is assessed.

The question I get most from program managers is “IL4 or IL5?” and the answer is almost always determined by data type, not by preference or budget. This post explains what each level actually means, how a Cloud Service Offering (CSO) earns a DISA Provisional Authorization at that level, how the connectivity requirements change between levels, and how inheritance from the cloud provider works inside your own RMF package.

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The four Impact Levels, defined

The CC SRG originally had six levels; IL1 and IL3 were retired in 2017 and folded into IL2 and IL4. The four that remain:

  • IL2: Publicly releasable information and non-controlled unclassified information. Think public websites, marketing content, and unclassified data with no CUI markings. The security baseline is FedRAMP Moderate, and connectivity can be over the public internet.
  • IL4: CUI, including export-controlled data, privacy information, protected health information, and other data that requires protection under law or policy but is not classified. Baseline is FedRAMP Moderate plus the DoD-specific “FedRAMP+” controls and CCIs the SRG adds. Connectivity to DoD networks goes through a Cloud Access Point.
  • IL5: CUI that the mission owner or data owner has determined requires a higher level of protection, and unclassified National Security System data. Same FedRAMP Moderate plus FedRAMP+ baseline as IL4, with additional requirements: the CSO must be dedicated to federal government tenants (no commercial co-tenancy at the infrastructure level), and personnel with access to the infrastructure must be U.S. persons with appropriate background investigations.
  • IL6: Classified information up to and including SECRET. The CSO must operate in cleared facilities with cleared personnel, be connected to SIPRNet, and meet the classified baseline under CNSSI 1253 for the applicable categorization. There is a short list of providers authorized at this level, all on dedicated classified regions.

The word “impact” in Impact Level is not the same as the confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact values in your CNSSI 1253 categorization, though they are related. The IL sets the ceiling for what the cloud service may hold. Your system’s categorization still determines your control baseline within that ceiling. A Moderate-Moderate-Moderate system holding CUI belongs in an IL4 or IL5 service; a Low-Low-Low public-facing site can live in IL2.

IL4 vs IL5: how the decision actually gets made

IL4 and IL5 share a control baseline, so the difference is not the number of controls you assess. The difference is who else is in the building. The SRG requires IL5 offerings to provide separation from non-federal tenants at the infrastructure level, which in practice means a government-community cloud region rather than a commercial region with logical separation. It also requires U.S. persons for personnel with privileged access to the physical and virtual infrastructure. Those two requirements are why IL5 regions cost more and have fewer services available.

You are in IL5 territory if any of these are true:

  • Your data is unclassified National Security System data. If the categorization process determined the system is an NSS, IL5 is the floor for unclassified cloud hosting.
  • Your CUI includes categories the data owner has designated as requiring higher protection. Examples that have driven IL5 in programs I have seen: certain controlled technical information, mission-critical logistics data, and some categories of law enforcement sensitive data.
  • Your mission owner or AO has a stated policy that mission systems with certain availability or integrity requirements go to IL5 regardless of CUI category. Component policies vary, so ask before you architect.

If none of those apply, IL4 is the correct level, and choosing IL5 anyway buys cost and service constraints without a security benefit the assessor will credit. The exception is when the data type will change: migrating from IL4 to IL5 later is a significant change with a new authorization effort attached, so start where you will end up.

What a DISA Provisional Authorization is and what it is not

A Cloud Service Offering does not get a DoD ATO; it gets a Provisional Authorization (PA) at a specific Impact Level from the DISA Authorizing Official. The PA means DISA has assessed the CSO against the SRG requirements for that level, usually building on the provider’s existing FedRAMP authorization plus the FedRAMP+ controls, and has determined it is suitable for DoD use at that level. The PA is provisional because it is not an authorization for any particular mission system to operate. It is an authorization for the service to be used by mission owners, who must still obtain their own ATO.

That distinction is where new cloud ISSOs get tripped up. A PA at IL5 tells you the provider’s infrastructure, physical security, personnel security, and platform-level controls have been assessed. It says nothing about how your team configured the virtual machines, who has access to your subscription, whether your storage buckets are public, or whether your application is STIGed. Everything the mission owner builds on top of the CSO is the mission owner’s responsibility, and the differences between FedRAMP and DoD RMF for cloud systems come down to that boundary line.

Check the PA scope carefully. A PA covers specific services in specific regions. A provider may hold an IL5 PA for core compute and storage while a newer managed service in the same region has an IL4 PA or none at all. Using an unauthorized service inside an authorized region is a finding, and the provider’s console will not warn you.

Connectivity: CAPs, BCAPs, and why IL4 and IL5 cannot use the open internet

The SRG requires that IL4 and IL5 CSOs connect to DoD networks through a Cloud Access Point (CAP), either the DISA-operated Boundary CAP (BCAP) or a component-approved CAP. The CAP provides boundary protection, traffic inspection, and monitoring between the NIPRNet and the cloud environment. IL2 services can be reached directly over the internet because the data is not sensitive; IL6 services connect through SIPRNet. For the ISSO this has three consequences:

  • Your authorization boundary diagram must show the CAP as an external interface, with the connection path, and your package must reference the CAP’s own authorization rather than re-assessing it.
  • Management access to the cloud environment (console access, API access, administrative sessions) must also traverse an approved path. Administrators reaching the console from a commercial internet connection is a finding under SC-7 and AC-17 that shows up on cloud SARs constantly.
  • The CAP onboarding process has its own timeline, often measured in months, and it runs in parallel with your RMF work. Start it the day the architecture is approved, not the week before assessment.

Inheriting controls from the CSP

The payoff of using a CSO with a PA is inheritance. The provider has implemented and been assessed on physical and environmental controls (the entire PE family), media protection for the underlying storage, much of the maintenance family, and the infrastructure-level portions of contingency planning, incident response, and system and communications protection. Your package inherits those controls rather than implementing them, and the mechanics of control inheritance are the same as inheriting from any other common control provider.

The provider publishes a customer responsibility matrix (CRM), sometimes called a shared responsibility matrix, for each authorized offering. It lists every control and marks it as provider-implemented, customer-implemented, or shared. Get the CRM for the exact services and region you use, because it changes between IL levels and service tiers. Then, control by control, mark inherited controls in eMASS by inheriting from the provider’s eMASS record where DISA has made it available, or by documenting the inheritance manually with the PA letter and CRM as artifacts.

Three things assessors check on cloud inheritance that are worth doing right the first time:

  • Shared controls are not inherited controls. If the CRM marks a control as shared, you must write your portion of the implementation. Encryption at rest is the classic case: the provider supplies the capability; you must enable it, manage the keys, and prove it.
  • Inherited controls still need the provider’s evidence to be current. The PA letter, its expiration, and the most recent continuous monitoring summary from the provider should be in your artifact set. An expired or suspended PA breaks your inheritance.
  • Your tailored baseline must still be yours. Inheriting from an IL5 provider does not change which controls apply to your system; the baseline selection and tailoring in Step 2 is driven by your categorization. Inheritance changes who satisfies each control, not whether it applies.

The customer side: what you still have to build

What remains yours after inheritance is where cloud ATOs are won or lost: identity and access management for the subscription and workloads, network configuration inside the virtual environment, OS and application STIG compliance, vulnerability scanning of the workloads, audit log forwarding to the CSSP, configuration management of deployed resources, data-level encryption and key management, backup and contingency planning, and incident response above the infrastructure layer. The provider’s native security tooling helps with several of these; using it does not shift the responsibility.

One pattern that works: treat the provider’s CRM as the starting point for your control implementation statements. For every control marked customer or shared, write the statement describing exactly what you configured, name the cloud service that implements it, and attach the configuration export or screenshot as evidence. For every control marked provider, write one sentence referencing the PA and the CRM row. That structure makes the assessor’s job easy, and an assessor whose job is easy writes shorter SARs.

Common cloud ATO findings by Impact Level

  • IL2 systems holding CUI. A public-facing service that quietly started storing PII or contractor data. The fix is a migration, not a POA&M.
  • IL4 workloads reached from the internet. Management access or user access bypassing the CAP.
  • Services without a PA at the required level. Especially newer managed services and marketplace offerings.
  • Stale CRM. Inheritance documented against a version of the responsibility matrix two revisions old.
  • IL5 personnel requirements assumed rather than verified. Contractor staff with privileged access to the mission owner’s environment who have not been vetted to the standard the data requires. The provider’s personnel meet the SRG requirement; yours must meet your component’s.

Pulling it together for the package

A cloud authorization package at IL4 or IL5 needs everything a traditional package needs, plus the PA letter, the CRM for your exact services, the CAP connection approval, and a boundary diagram that shows where the provider’s responsibility ends and yours begins. If you want that artifact set laid out alongside the standard RMF deliverables, with the inheritance and connectivity items called out so nothing gets discovered during assessment week, the RMF Checklist is the document I use to keep cloud packages complete.

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Babux, active DoD ISSO and author of RMF Insider

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